Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge Gracia\u27s proposal by Vajda, Jonathan
University of Windsor
Scholarship at UWindsor
Essays of Significance Essays of Significance & Critical Reflections 2016
Mar 12th, 1:30 PM - 2:00 PM
Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A
critique of Jorge Gracia's proposal
Jonathan Vajda
Western Michigan University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/essaysofsignificance
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Event is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Essays of Significance by an authorized administrator of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca.
Jonathan Vajda, "Conditions of Fundamental Metaphysics: A critique of Jorge Gracia's proposal" (March 12, 2016). Essays of
Significance. Paper 5.
http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/essaysofsignificance/2016/eos2016/5
Conditions	of	Fundamental	Metaphysics:	A	critique	of	Jorge	Gracia’s	proposal	 1	
Introduction	
	 Jorge	Gracia’s	paper	“The	Fundamental	Character	of	Metaphysics”	(2014)	proposes	five	
conditions	 that,	 if	 satisfied,	 would	 be	 sufficient	 to	 establish	 metaphysics	 as	 a	 fundamental	
discipline	for	other	sciences:	(1)	universal	extension,	(2)	ontological	neutralism,	(3)	sui	generis	
character,	(4)	overall	disciplinary	integration,	and	(5)	necessity.	After	framing	the	relevance	and	
motivation	for	such	a	project,	 I	make	the	case	that	his	metaphysical	project	requires	revision.	
Not	only	are	the	conditions	insufficient	for	fundamental	character,	there	are	problems	with	the	
conditions	themselves.	His	project	intends	to	be	radically	inclusive,	yet	unintentionally	excludes	
certain	 views;	 and	 his	 notion	 of	 fundamentality	 avoids	 reference	 to	 establishing	 normative	
principia,	 yet	 a	 key	 benefit	 of	 grounding	 is	 to	 provide	 such.	 Finally,	 an	 examination	 of	 the	
individual	conditions	yields	that	his	first	condition	is	ambiguous,	unclear,	and	problematic;	his	
second	 condition	 for	 neutrality	 is	 unworkable.	 Therefore,	 I	 do	 not	 preclude	 any	 and	 all	
metaphysics	 from	 becoming	 fundamental;	 rather,	 I	 argue	 that	 to	 establish	 fundamentality	 it	
would	not	be	characterized	as	Gracia	proposes.	
An	Order	of	the	Sciences	
	 Gracia’s	proposal	is	meta-metaphysical.	It	is	an	attempt	to	ground	the	diverse	sciences	
with	 their	 diverse	 objects	 of	 study1	upon	 a	 new	 scheme	 of	 metaphysics.	 	 A	 fundamental	
science,	 if	possible,	could	ask	and	answer	the	following	questions	about	 the	other	disciplines:	
how	 should	 we	 different	 disciplines	 relate	 to	 one	 another?	 Should	 we	 give	 priority	 to	 one	
discipline	 and	 its	 findings	 over	 another?	 Might	 one	 science	 become	 fundamental	 to	 all	 the	
																																																								
1	That	is,	the	object	that	the	inquirer	attends	to;	commonly	called	a	‘subject	matter.’	
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other	sciences?	The	goal	of	this	proposal	is	to	attain	unity	and	order	across	disciplines.	Gracia	
argues	that	this	unity	could	be	attained	by	addressing	questions	of	fundamentality.	
His	 current	 proposal	 for	 a	 fundamental	 metaphysics	 is	 a	 new	 resolution	 to	 an	 old	
concern.	 Among	 other	 historic	 attempts,	 Robert	 Kilwardby,	 a	 contemporary	 of	 Aquinas	 and	
archbishop	of	Canterbury,	set	out	an	order	of	the	sciences	(de	ortu	scientiarum),2	wherein	the	
so-called	 ‘first	 principles’	 of	 philosophy	 would	 provide	 principia	 for	 natural	 philosophy	 and	
other	sciences.	On	the	one	hand,	 if	an	order	of	the	sciences	is	present	today,	mathematics	or	
physics	would	be	 the	most	 likely	 candidates	with	 respect	 to	providing	ontological	 foundation	
for	other	sciences.	On	the	other	hand,	as	a	basis	for	epistemic	authority,	an	order	of	sciences	
may	seem	irrelevant,	since	academic	disciplines	often	remain	relatively	autonomous	and	none	
is	construed	to	have	epistemic	authority	over	another.	The	desire	for	unification	has	often	been	
sought	through	interdisciplinary	studies.	Gracia	is	correct	that	the	result	has	been	inadequate.3	
Interdisciplinary	attempts	are	neither	sufficiently	exhaustive	(they	cannot	go	deep	enough),	nor	
are	their	methodologies	capable	of	arbitrating	between	sciences	consistently.4	A	 fundamental	
science	would	have	robust	methodology	to	unify	the	academic	disciplines.	
However,	given	the	relative	 lack	of	confidence	in	earlier	metaphysics	proposals,	a	new	
approach	may	be	necessary.	Gracia	claims	that	a	fundamental	science	would	need	to	take	into																																																									
2	José	Filipe	Silva.	“Robert	Kilwardby.”	In	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	edited	by	
Edward	N.	Zalta,	Fall	2014,	2014.	http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/robert-
kilwardby/	
3	“The	perspective	adopted	by	each	science	is	by	itself	too	narrow	for	the	understanding	of	the	
issues	it	investigate	[sic]	and	their	relation	to	other	sciences.”		Jorge	J.	E.		Gracia.	“The	
Fundamental	Character	of	Metaphysics.”	310.	
4	The	researcher	must	shift	subject	matter	and	methodology	at	various	points	unique	to	their	
sciences;	without	self-consciously	adopting	a	more	fundamental	methodology,	she	cannot	
mediate	among	the	disciplines.	One	must	stand	outside	of	the	discipline	in	order	to	make	such	
determinations.	
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account	that	history	of	metaphysics'	successes	and	failures,	recognizing	dead-ends	of	previous	
attempts	 and	 yet	 overcoming	 their	 respective	 limitations.	 Gracia	 has	 marked	 out	 what	 a	
fundamental	 metaphysical	 discipline	 would	 be	 characterized	 by:	 a	 science	 that	 studies	
everything	and	integrates	everything	together.	He	outlines	five	criteria	that	together	would	be	
sufficient	for	such	a	discipline	to	be	fundamental.	
Function	of	Criteria	for	Fundamentality	
Gracia	offers	five	conditions	for	fundamentality.	In	evaluating	whether	these	conditions	
satisfy	or	are	desirable	unto	a	fundamental	metaphysics,	two	matters	must	be	discussed	along	
the	way:	what	kinds	of	conditions	are	these?	If	they	are	satisfied,	would	Gracia’s	proposal	show	
metaphysics	 to	 have	 a	 fundamental	 character?	 Regarding	 the	 latter	 question,	 this	 will	 be	
discussed	after	outlining	the	conditions	below.	
Regarding	the	former	question,	it	is	not	clear	whether	these	criteria	are	to	be	taken	as	
sufficient,	 necessary,	 or	 sufficient	and	 necessary	 conditions.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 these	 criteria	
appear	 to	 function	 as	 necessary	 conditions,	 as	 his	 paper	 aims	 to	 determine	 “the	 conditions	
required	by	fundamentality.”5	Similarly:	“The	fundamental	character	of	metaphysics	must	then	
have	to	do	with	certain	conditions	that	must	be	satisfied	by	the	claims	the	discipline	makes	and	
the	objects	about	which	 it	makes	 those	claims.”6	That	 is,	 for	metaphysics	 to	be	 fundamental,	
they	necessitate	these	conditions.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	conditions	seem	to	be	regarded	as	
sufficient	conditions,	as	he	claims	that	the	“satisfaction	of	these	conditions	would	be	sufficient	
																																																								
5	Gracia,	305.	Emphasis	mine.	
6	Gracia,	307.	Emphasis	mine.	
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to	justify	the	thesis	that	metaphysics	has	a	fundamental	character,	or	is	fundamental.”7	This	is	
ambiguous.	
On	 the	 assumption	 that	 Gracia	 is	 consistent,	 the	 reader	 ought	 to	 put	 these	 claims	
together	 and	 simply	 posit	 that	 the	 conditions	 are	both	 sufficient	 and	necessary.8	On	 the	one	
hand,	if	he	intended	to	merely	provide	sufficient	conditions,	then	if	it	turns	out	a	single	criterion	
were	to	be	jettisoned	or	replaced,	that	would	do	little	damage	to	his	thesis.	On	the	other	hand,	
if	 the	 criteria	 are	 sufficient	 only	 when	 held	 together,	 then	 the	 proposal	 suffers	 if	 but	 one	
condition	 is	 undermined.	 In	 what	 follows,	 I	 will	 make	 a	 case	 that	 two	 conditions	 can	 be	
undermined.	
Gracia’s	Five	Conditions	
	 If	 metaphysics	 could	 be	 a	 fundamental	 discipline,	 what	 character	 would	 it	 have?	
According	 to	 Gracia,	 if	 the	 conditions	 below	 are	 satisfied,	 then	 metaphysics	 would	 possess	
fundamental	character.	I	quote:	
• (1c)	universal	extension:	the	object	of	study	of	metaphysics	must	extend	to	everything	
that	can	be	an	object	of	human	understanding;	
• (2c)	 ontological	 neutralism:	 the	 object	 of	 study	 of	metaphysics	must	 be	 conceived	 in	
ontologically	neutral	terms	at	the	outset;	
• (3c)	sui	generis	character:	the	claims	made	in	metaphysics	about	its	object	must	not	be	
the	same	as,	or	overlap	with,	the	claims	made	in	other	disciplines	of	learning;	
• (4c)	 overall	 disciplinary	 integration:	 the	 claims	 made	 in	 metaphysics	 about	 its	 object	
must	include	claims	that	serve	to	understand	how	the	claims	made	by	other	disciplines	
of	 learning	 are	 related	 to,	 and	 can	 be	 integrated	 into,	 an	 overall	 consistent	
understanding	of	the	world;	and	
• (5c)	necessity:	necessity	is	a	desideratum	of	metaphysical	claims.9	
																																																								
7	Gracia,	308.	Emphasis	mine.	
8	That	is,	metaphysics	has	a	fundamental	character	if	and	only	if	all	five	conditions	are	satisfied.	
9		Gracia,	307.	
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While	 I	 will	 provide	 a	 fuller	 exposition	 below	 for	 the	 first	 two	 conditions,	 for	 now	 I	 will	
briefly	outline	their	significance:	The	point	of	the	first	is	that	for	any	given	discipline	or	inquiry,	
if	metaphysics	would	be	fundamental	to	it,	then	metaphysics	must	speak	that	discipline’s	object	
of	study	 in	some	way,	whether	directly	or	 indirectly.	Second,	ontological	commitments	are	to	
be	 decided	 later,	 and	 nothing	 can	 be	 excluded	 from	 the	 outset.	 Third,	 a	 fundamental	
metaphysics	 must	 ask	 and	 answer	 distinct	 questions	 that	 other	 disciplines	 do	 not.	 Fourth,	
metaphysics	 must	 mediate	 between	 disciplines,	 relating	 their	 import	 to	 one	 another.	 Fifth,	
metaphysics	attempts	to	ascertain	necessary	truths.	A	metaphysics	possessing	all	five	aspects,	
according	to	Gracia,	would	make	it	fundamental.	
Fundamentality	Sufficiently	Satisfied?	
	 The	 conditions,	 as	 presented,	 do	 not	 succeed	 in	 establishing	 a	 metaphysics	 with	
fundamental	 character.	 There	 are	 at	 least	 two	 concerns	 if	 it	 were	 to	 be	 admitted	 as	 a	
fundamental	science.	Moreover,	as	will	be	explained	below,	there	seems	to	be	problems	with	
the	conditions	themselves.	The	first	concern:	Gracia	 is	 insufficiently	 inclusive	even	on	his	own	
terms.	 As	Gracia	 proposes	 a	metaphysics	 that	 satisfies	 his	 first	 condition,	 he	 suggests	 that	 it	
would	investigate	metaphysical	matters	in	the	following	way:	
“The	 understanding	 of	 metaphysics	 as	 the	 study	 of	 categories	 satisfies	 the	
condition	of	universal	extension	stipulated	earlier	for	the	fundamental	character	
of	the	discipline	in	that	it	implies	that	metaphysics	studies	everything	insofar	as	
everything	we	know	or	can	know	must	be	able	to	be	expressed	by	a	predicate.”	
10		
																																																								
10	Gracia,	312.	
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His	proposal	does	not	seem	careful	here,	because	there	are	several	metaphysical	theories	(e.g.,	
Ted	 Sider’s	 realism	 about	 structure)	 which	 explicitly	 seek	 to	 “go	 beyond	 the	 predicate.”11	It	
seems	 as	 though	 Gracia	 is	 being	 unnecessarily	 reductionistic	 according	 to	 his	 own	 project's	
criteria.	Either	Gracia	must	revise	his	metaphysical	proposal	in	order	to	be	inclusive	(or	at	least	
sensitive)	to	these	kinds	of	projects,	or	else	he	must	reject	them	out	of	hand.	If	the	former,	it	is	
not	straight-forward	how	he	would	do	so	neutrally.	If	the	latter,	he	would	defeat	one	of	his	own	
conditions:	 either	 Universal	 Extension	 or	 Ontological	 Neutralism.	 Either	 way,	 revision	 is	
necessary.12	
My	 second	 concern:	Gracia	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 afford	 us	 the	 traditional	 benefits	 of	 a	
fundamental	 science.	 Fundamentality	 allows	 for	 mediation,	 perhaps,	 but	 how	 might	
metaphysics	mediate	without	establishing	the	“first	principles”?	Yet	Gracia	finds	 limited	value	
in	 that	 approach.13	Mediation	 implies	 norms	 by	 which	 to	 govern	 the	 relationships	 between	
disciplines.	 I	 have	 in	 mind	 that	 a	 fundamental	 metaphysics,	 if	 it	 grounds	 anything,	 would	
provide	some	sort	of	principia	(first	principles,	first	philosophy),	whether	in	the	form	of	“logical	
principles”	or	“ultimate	causes”	(not	just	efficient	causes,	but	rather	explanations	or	becauses).	
Even	 the	 role	 of	mediation	 assumes	 the	 possession	 of	 those	 principia,	 since	 it	 is	 by	 them	 it	
arbitrates.	If	principia	are	not	desiderata	of	a	fundamental	metaphysics,	I	am	unaware	what	the	
motivation	 for	 this	project	might	be.	While	 the	 fifth	 condition	 (necessity)	may	be	 included	 in	
																																																								
11	Theodore	Sider.	Writing	the	Book	of	the	World.	85-104.	
12	I	tentatively	recommend	a	revision	that	would	accommodate	these	views	as	follows:	
metaphysics	studies	everything	insofar	as	everything	we	can	refer	to	must	be	able	to	be	
predicated,	quantified	over,	or	gestured	at	by	way	of	analogy.	This	may	be	sufficiently	inclusive	
for	Gracia’s	aims.	
13	Gracia,	305.	
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order	 to	 preserve	 this	 very	 trait,	 Gracia	 does	 not	 make	 this	 connection	 explicit.14	Thus,	 his	
proposal	seems	to	be	too	modest	to	motivate	pursuit.	
Evaluation	of	the	Conditions	
	 Were	the	above	concerns	insufficient	to	reject	Gracia's	proposal	as	stated,	some,	though	
not	all,	 of	 the	 conditions	he	proposes	are	unclear,	 suspect,	or	unnecessary.	 I	will	 exposit	 the	
first	two	individually,	commenting	only	briefly	on	the	latter	three.	
1.	Universal	Extension.	
Gracia	proposes	a	 radically	 inclusive	metaphysics,	 such	 that	“metaphysics	 should	have	
something	to	say	about	everything.”15	His	first	criterion	has	 in	view	not	 just	actual	things,	but	
also	unreal	things	and	concepts	such	as	“being,	non-being,	reality,	unreality,”	etc.	16	If	humans	
can	attend	their	minds	to	something,	whether	concrete	objects	(e.g.,	trees)	or	abstract	objects	
(e.g.,	circles),	metaphysics	would	speak	to	that	intelligible	object.	However,	there	seems	to	be	
two	different	senses	of	the	proper	object	of	metaphysical	study.	
In	the	first	sense,	the	proper	object	of	study	is	everything,	but	the	method	or	manner	by	
means	of	which	everything	may	be	examined	is	unique.	On	this	reading	(which	takes	a	cue	from	
the	third	criterion),	the	way	tables	and	trees	are	examined	is	the	same	way	that	unicorns	and	
numbers	are	examined.	Consider	by	analogy	that	if	a	physicist	and	a	chemist	study	a	table,	they	
would	have	the	same	object	but	different	methodologies	regarding	it.	Metaphysics	would	have	
the	widest	scope	possible,	and	thus	no	object	would	be	outside	of	 its	study.	This	reading	has																																																									
14	Gracia	writes	that	the	fifth	condition	is	satisfied	when	a	“metaphysics	seeks	to	make	claims	
involving	necessarily	connections.”	Gracia,	314.	The	phrase	‘necessary	connections’	is	a	far	cry	
from	an	explicit	goal	of	establishing	principles	or	constraints	for	the	other	sciences.	
15	Gracia,	307.	
16	Gracia,	307.	
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support	as	Gracia	claims,	“a	most	fundamental	discipline	should	study	not	just	a	number	of	the	
things	that	can	be	studied,	but	everything	that	can	be	studied.”	17	
In	 the	 second	 sense,	 the	 object	 of	 study	 is	everything,	 albeit	 indirectly.	 The	 object	 of	
study	would	be	macro-categories,	 abstractions,	 and	any	 concept	 (possible	or	 impossible).	On	
this	 reading,	 metaphysics	 would	 properly	 study	 the	 categories,	 but	 other	 things	 (indeed,	 all	
things)	are	brought	in	view	only	by	implication	or	indirectly.	Thus,	for	example,	a	table	is	not	a	
proper	 object	 of	 metaphysical	 study;	 however,	 since	 metaphysics	 studies	 categories	 and	
predicates,	any	predicates	that	apply	to	tables	would	bring	tables	into	metaphysics’	periphery.	
Metaphysics	 then	 speaks	 to	everything	 indirectly	 as	 it	performs	 its	unique	metaphysical	 task.	
This	reading	has	support	as	Gracia	suggests	that	metaphysics	would	ask	questions	regarding	the	
most	 general	 things,	18	and	 that	 “metaphysics	 studies	 categories”	19	and	 that	 it	would	exclude	
singular	concrete	objects,	“such	as	‘Socrates’.”	20	
It	is	not	obvious	that	one	sense	is	to	be	preferred	over	the	other.	One	way	to	determine	
could	 be	whether	 one	 sense	may	 be	more	 successful	 (as	 a	 sufficient	 condition)	 at	 providing	
fundamentality.	To	that	end,	the	first	sense	is	very	similar	to	the	third	criterion,	such	that	it	may	
imply	 and	 obviate	 a	 separate	 condition.	 The	 third	 criterion	 deals	 with	 the	 claims	 of	
metaphysics,	as	 it	would	need	 to	have	a	unique	manner	or	method	of	 study	 for	 its	discipline	
such	that	its	claims	are	not	dealt	with	by	another	discipline.	If	the	first	criterion	is	so	construed,	
																																																								
17	Gracia,	307.	
18	Gracia,	307.	
19	Gracia,	311.	
20	Gracia,	312.	
Conditions	of	Fundamental	Metaphysics:	A	critique	of	Jorge	Gracia’s	proposal	 9	
the	 third	 is	 unnecessary.	 However,	 if	 the	 second	 sense	 is	 preferred,	 it	 is	 not	 obvious	 how	
Gracia’s	project	differs	from	the	first	principles	approaches	he	notes	to	have	limited	success.21	
The	last	feature	of	this	condition	is	that	the	inclusiveness	should	extend	to	metaphysical	
approaches	 themselves,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	 successes	 and	 failures	 of	 historical	
metaphysical	inquiries.	He	argues	that	in	order	for	metaphysics	to	be	fundamental	it	does	not	
need	 to	 (and	 must	 not)	 decide	 at	 the	 outset	 among	 different	 “reductionist”22	accounts	 of	
metaphysics.	 Rather	metaphysics	would	draw	 from	all	 prior	 investigations	 in	which	 someone	
found	an	object	worthy	of	study,	whether	an	Aristotelian	being	qua	being,	or	even	those	that	
investigate	Nothing	or	Non-being.	
The	acceptance	of	 this	 condition	has	 a	 cost.	 Tentatively	 assume	as	 a	benefit	 that	 this	
condition	 justifies	 fundamentality.	 Not	 all	 metaphysical	 inquiries	 are	 equal;	 they	 have,	 as	
admitted,	“successes	and	failures.”	23	How	could	this	fundamental	discipline	be	implemented?	
On	the	one	hand	it	must	be	inclusive	of	such	categories	of	non-being,	and	yet	on	the	other	hand	
it	must	make	determinations	on	the	success	of	such	approaches	(so	as	to	exclude	failures).	It	is	
unclear	 how	 the	 discipline	 would	 be	 able	 to	 regard	 the	 investigation	 of	 non-being,	 on	 the	
whole,	 a	 failure:	 perhaps	 it	 can	 never	 make	 such	 a	 determination.	 24 	To	 me	 this	 is	 an	
undesirable	 consequence,	 because	 it	 calls	 into	 question	 how	 progress	 in	 metaphysical	
investigation	might	be	possible.																																																										
21	Namely,	metaphysics	as	fundamental	via	“logical	principles”	or	via	“ultimate	causes.”	Gracia	
seems	to	me	to	be	invoking	here	some	kind	of	study	of	categories	for	the	purpose	of	providing	
some	principia	for	the	other	disciplines.	Does	he	escape	his	own	concerns?	
22	Gracia,	309.	
23	Gracia,	308.	
24	Does	Gracia	have	in	mind	a	descriptive	enterprise,	whereby	metaphysicians	merely	
investigate	categories	and	provide	a	wide	taxonomy?	I	do	not	find	this	a	likely	reading.	
Questions	regarding	what	metaphysics	“must”	seem	to	invoke	unexplained	norms.	
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2.	Ontological	Neutralism.	
Given	the	condition	of	radical	inclusivism,	the	condition	appears	to	stipulate	that	when	
including	all	 ontological	 categories	and	methods,	 they	must	be	 framed	neutrally	 so	as	 to	not	
bias	 our	 development	 of	 metaphysics.	 This	 seems	 prima	 facie	 desirable,	 since	 a	 premature	
judgment	 of	 a	 “particular	 conception	 of	 the	 discipline”	 would	 indeed	 eliminate	 meta-
metaphysical	views	by	implication.	
Yet	 how	 is	 neutrality	 as	 Gracia	 intends	 even	 possible?	 Not	 only	 does	 every	
metaphysician	evaluate	 from	a	vantage	 (even	when	one	has	an	open	mind),	 it	 is	not	obvious	
how	 the	metaphysician	 can	 remain	neutral	 indefinitely.	Perhaps	a	descriptive	enterprise	may	
have	some	traction,	but	as	soon	as	any	normative	approach	is	involved,	the	metaphysician	will	
be	invoking	criteria	that	may	not	be	shared	by	other	approaches.	Is	there	a	universal	norm	or	
principle	to	guide	any	and	all	meta-metaphysical	views?	I	have	doubts.	Hence	I	call	to	question	
whether	 it	 is	 “an	 unnecessary	 reductionist	 gimmick”25	to	 evaluate	metaphysics	 from	 starting	
point.	 Gracia	 would	 need	 to	 motivate	 how	 neutrality	 would	 be	 possible,	 and	 that	 having	
starting	points	would	be	undesirable.	
Conditions	3-5:	Sui	generis	character;	Disciplinary	integration;	Necessity	
	 The	latter	three	criteria	require	less	commentary.	The	third	condition	simply	preserves	
metaphysics	 as	 a	 genuine	 discipline.	 Gracia	 is	 correct	 to	 assert	 that	 if	 metaphysics	 were	
fundamental,	then	its	discipline	must	be	distinct	and	not	simply	an	“aggregate	of	claims”	made	
by	 the	other	disciplines.26	Gracia's	 fourth	 condition	 is	 that	 it	mediates	across	 sciences,	 as	 the																																																									
25	Gracia,	309.	
26	Metaphysics	cannot	be	dependent	upon	the	contingent	and	revisable	claims	of	those	
sciences	it	grounds.	
Conditions	of	Fundamental	Metaphysics:	A	critique	of	Jorge	Gracia’s	proposal	 11	
diversity	of	methods	and	objects	 imply	(a)	there	 is	no	singular	“science”	but	“sciences”,27	and	
(b)	that	particular	sciences	are	incapable	of	fulfilling	the	role	proposed	for	metaphysics	due	to	
their	 narrow	 focus	 and	 perspective. 28 	 29 	Fifth,	 metaphysics	 must	 make	 necessary	 claims.	
Progress	is	the	establishment	of	more	accurate	necessary	claims,	even	if	they	can	be	called	into	
question	 or	 improved	 upon.	 This	 condition	 is	 certainly	 desirable,	 especially	 if	 the	
determinations	 in	metaphysics	 (if	 progress	 is	 possible)	would	 have	 import	 for	 the	 disciplines	
founded	upon	metaphysics.	Hence,	I	have	no	major	concern	here.	
Conclusion	
	 Let’s	 take	stock,	 then,	what	 I	have	attempted	 to	show.	First,	 that	 the	establishment	of	
fundamental	 science	 is	 desirable	 given	historical	 considerations.	 Second,	 that	 the	proposal	 as	
stated	 needs	 revision	 on	 two	 fronts	 before	 it	 can	 be	 a	 fundamental	 science:	 its	 regarding	
predication	as	all-inclusive	is	actually	unintentionally	exclusive;	its	goals	should	seek	to	establish	
principia	or	norms	 for	 sciences.	Third,	when	examining	 the	 individual	 conditions,	 the	 first	has	
some	significant	problems	in	implementation;	the	second	is	overly	optimistic	about	neutrality;	
the	third,	fourth,	and	fifth	conditions	seem	necessary	to	the	fundamental	project	and	require	no	
significant	 revisions.	 Thus,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 a	 fundamental	 science	 may	 perhaps	 be	
established,	but	not	as	Gracia	has	proposed.	
																																																								
27	Gracia,	309-310.	Underlining	mine.	
28	Gracia,	310.	
29	Could	a	sub-discipline,	e.g.,	philosophy	of	science	or	ontology	proper,	handle	this?	
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